Russia-India Nuclear Submarine Cooperation

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On 15 Sep 2021, Australia-UK-US announced the AUKUS initiative that will facilitate Australia to acquire eight conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). Contrary to common perception, AUKUS is not the first nuclear submarine deal. The Russia-India deal, termed as RUIN by a renowned strategic studies expert, covered a nuclear submarine cooperation in the 1980s. It included leasing nuclear-powered submarines to India to gain operational experience. The leasing of nuclear submarines to India played an important role in its indigenous nuclear submarine program. Transfer of nuclear propulsion technology has serious implications for global and regional security as conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines can also carry dual-capable missiles that may impact nuclear balance and strategic stability.

In 1988, the Soviet Union became the first State to ‘lease’ SSN to India. Then, in February 2012, Russia ‘leased’ an Akula class fast attack submarine to India for ten years. In 2019, India signed a ‘ten-year lease agreement’ for another Akula class fast attack submarine to be transferred to India by 2025. The Indian government approved the construction plan of six SSNs in 2015; the first SSN is likely to be launched in 2032. With Russian support, India is set to complete a fleet of four Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) by 2025.

The RUIN represents the first instance in which an NPT nuclear weapon state provided a nuclear submarine, complete with HEU fuel, to a state outside the NPT. This was a critical turning point when naval propulsion technologies were proliferated from five NPT nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.

India’s nuclear submarine predates its first nuclear test in 1974. It began in 1966, with feasibility studies on marine nuclear propulsion, when the purchase of SSN was deliberated upon but dismissed as unrealistic. India started its so-called indigenous nuclear submarine reactor program in the 1970s at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). However, Indian nuclear scientists could not produce a viable reactor, and India turned to the Soviets for assistance.

In April 1982, the Soviet Chief of General Staff conveyed the USSR’s willingness to lease an SSN to India. This was the beginning of Project Samudra (Project Ocean) which was to include two vessels codenamed S-1 and S-2. Project S-1 culminated with the lease of a Soviet Charlie-class SSN in 1988. The boat served the Indian Navy from 1988 to 1991.

Pakistan strongly criticized the Soviet Union’s decision to lease nuclear submarines and highlighted that a great power ought to have a stronger sense of responsibility. The lease of a nuclear submarine to India was not covered by the IAEA safeguards and Pakistan pointed out that it reserved the right to take necessary ‘countervailing’ steps.

Project S-2 paved the way for establishing the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) Directorate in 1988 to develop SSN based on Russia’s design with an India Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). India’s nuclear establishment faced technological hurdles in producing a viable reactor design because of integration and fabrication problems. In early 1996, the project was reportedly frozen due to technical and financial problems.

After that, India sought assistance from former Russian engineers and defense workers. The Russian submarine design bureau ‘Rubin’ reportedly cooperated with the DRDO in developing submarine PWRs. India’s so-called indigenous PWR was developed at BARC with Russia’s support and is believed to be based on information obtained from leased Soviet-era submarine. This points us towards the objective reality that the Indian naval nuclear program is not indigenous and is an outcome of the sustained transfer of Russian technology.

Soon after the 1998 tests, India decided to convert the SSN designed for conventional operation into a strategic weapon system for the delivery of nuclear weapons, i.e., SSBN. It is worth noting that the current design of India’s SSBN INS Arihant is remarkably similar to the Charlie-class Soviet submarine. Reports indicate that the hull and reactor design of upcoming SSBNs are based on Russian Project 885 Severodvinsk-class submarines. Russian engineers supported India’s Department of Atomic Energy and DRDO with nuclear propulsion and reactor miniaturization designs to fit aboard its submarine.

In 1988, the US Department of State reported that Russia was also helping India develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile ‘Sagarika.’ A former science and technology advisor to the Indian Prime Minister writes that Arihant would have been impossible to realize without the ex-Soviet Union and then Russia’s massive all-around consultancy.

Other states have followed the precedent set by RUIN in the form of similar deals, such as AUKUS. India, being an integral part of the US-led so-called Indo-Pacific axis, may be offered AUKUS-like cooperation in the future in the form of Japan-UK-US-India or India-France-US (INFRUS). These developments and India’s likely quest to develop a large submarine nuclear force would strike a severe blow to peace and strategic stability in South Asia. According to estimates, India would be able to launch more than a hundred nuclear warheads from the sea at a maximum range of 12,000 kilometers once its SSBN fleet is fully operational.  

India’s SSBN and SSN fleet would dangerously undermine deterrence and crisis stability. SSNs equipped with dual-capable weapon systems would exacerbate the chances of conflict due to inherent ambiguities. During crises, any Indian submarine carrying dual-capable missiles would have to be considered a nuclear threat, even if these missiles were only carrying conventional warheads. Such development would instill extreme instability during any future crises between Pakistan and India, with the dangers of a rapid escalation from conventional to nuclear conflict in South Asia.

Pakistan has responded to the development of India’s nuclear submarine force by testing Babur III submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) from a dynamic platform capable of carrying various types of payloads and having a range of 450 kilometers. The development of a restrained and modest second strike capability is in line with Pakistan’s nuclear policy of maintaining strategic balance instead of gaining parity with India, which is achieved by maintaining strategic capabilities at a level, i.e., minimum for the credibility of deterrence.

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