Introduction
On 9 March 2022, a nuclear-capable supersonic cruise missile of one nuclear power landed without any provocation on the territory of another nuclear power. This was an unprecedented event in the nuclear age and another review is needed. The targeted nuclear weapons state exercised extreme restraint. It did not give a matching response or escalate the crisis by responding in ‘launch under attack’ circumstances, a Cold War term used for contemplating various nuclear scenarios between the United States and Russia. The term implies that a nuclear power will launch a nuclear weapon strike against the aggressor after determining that the aggressor has fired a nuclear-capable missile on the former’s territory.
The incident happened amidst a precarious environment in South Asia, where New Delhi aspires for a splendid first-strike option on one hand, and, on the other hand, more dangerously, has an operational doctrine to fight a limited conventional war to remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. It is also pertinent to consider that since India’s first nuclear test in 1974, South Asia has been beset with unique challenges. The challenges to strategic stability between the two South Asian nuclear powers are beyond the usual deterrence, arms race, crisis, and first-strike stability parameters.
What Happened?
To see what lessons can be drawn from the incident, a gist of what happened on 9 March is necessary to establish how a crisis developed, peaked, and de-escalated and why it matters.
This assessment is based on what is available in open source because neither of the parties involved has declassified details of the incident. Since it was an unprecedented event, it is imperative that someday a full-scale study, based on primary information is done. The primary merit of such an undertaking would be to reduce the risk of unintended war and understand the downside of trying to surprise a nuclear power and seeking space for limited war in a nuclear environment. In this short piece, both Indian and Pakistani versions of the developments and the global responses have been accounted for the sake of fairness.
BrahMos missile was fired from Sirsa Haryana air base in India, and it crashed in Pakistan’s Mian Channu Khanewal district area on 9 March 2022 at 1850 hours in the evening. Some civilian property was damaged, and there were no casualties. The missile traveled 124 kilometers in Pakistani territory in 3 minutes and 44 seconds. Pakistan strongly condemned the incident and warned against recurrence.
What were the Reactions?
On March 11, Pakistan’s foreign office informed the Indian envoy that such irresponsible incidents reflected India’s disregard for air safety and callousness towards regional peace and stability. Pakistan’s MoFA stated that the act violated international law, the UN Charter, the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, civil aviation rules, and safety protocols.
The next day, Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MoFA) statement demanded a joint probe to accurately establish the facts surrounding the incident. It rejected the Indian decision to hold an internal inquiry.
Significantly, India did not use the DGMO Hotline, one of the few working confidence building measures (CBMs) between the two states, and, after forty-eight hours, issued a statement characterizing it as a ‘technical malfunction’ which was ‘deeply regrettable.’ India ordered a court of inquiry to look into the matter. Later on, three Indian Air Force officers were sacked for deviation from SOPs. They challenged the decision while considering themselves as having been made scapegoats.
The situation invited diverse reactions. Pakistan rejected the one-sided investigations, and China called for conducting ‘thorough investigations, strengthening information sharing, and establishing a notification mechanism to prevent recurrence and miscalculation.’ However, the United States called it an accident. At the same time, the leading Indian print and electronic media houses dubbed the misfire an incident that harmed relations with Pakistan. The Union government told the Delhi high court that the incident could have led to a ‘warlike situation’ between the two states.
What is the Significance?
To gauge the significance of this incident, first, we need to answer a question – can a nuclear-capable cruise missile be accidentally fired? Answering this question is essential for drawing pertinent lessons. More so, because BrahMos is a nuclear-capable missile – some in the West don’t want to accept this fact unless India claims it.
A cruise missile usually has a programmed flight path to reach its target. It can also be controlled by a satellite or other means, so inadvertent or accidental launch chances are almost inconceivable. Most nuclear-capable missiles have fail-safe mechanisms and protocols to avoid accidental or inadvertent launch. These include authentic codes, self-destruct mechanisms and other fail-safe systems. Additionally, nuclear powers should have good command and control mechanisms to ensure centralized control.
The excuses provided by Indians make little conventional wisdom. This begs the question, why would they deliberately do this? The flight and reaction times in contiguous land frontiers are very short, and the nuclear risk is high. This can create the so-called ‘use it or lose it dilemma.’ If we recall the prevalent environment once this incident occurred, Pakistan was grappling with the political developments, while India had deployed two batteries of S400 systems acquired from Russia – perhaps it wanted to draw Pakistan out, test its response and thresholds, and check the efficacy of S400. Shooting Pakistani systems would be justified as a defensive measure against an accidental launch. Apparently, Pakistan does not have matching capability of supersonic cruise missiles, and India may have felt invulnerable and tested Pakistani resolve.
The BrahMos incident was unprecedented because it was the first case of a nuclear-capable missile used in this manner. It can be recalled that in 2017, an American B52 accidentally carried six nuclear-tipped missiles. In 1995, Russians mistook a Norwegian rocket for an attack. The missile veered off course, and the Russians did not launch a so-called retaliatory strike. Hence, this incident was unprecedented.
What are the Implications?
We need to know whether it was an accidental launch in order to study the implications. If it was an accidental launch, it clearly exposed Indian command and control systems. If it can fail in peace time, all bets are off in times of crises and war. Has India delegated the decision to junior commanders who can launch at will in peacetime? If it was a technical error, the buyers of BrahMos should be cautious when placing orders for errant missiles, and the case applies more to the sellers.
If it was a deliberate act, India took a considerable risk that no nuclear-capable state could dare earlier. If we consider crises behavior – India has been the most irresponsible nuclear state and has displayed similar irresponsible behavior during the 2019 crisis by reportedly threatening to fire six BrahMos missiles and taking out a SSBN deterrence patrol in the Arabian Sea – the submarine launched ballistic missile at the mercy of a Captain of the vessel with orders to fire at will!
What are the Lessons?
The BrahMos incident teaches several lessons. First, as recommended above, it will be useful to publish a study. This and similar incidents are textbook cases of learning crises behavior. Those who know firsthand the incident may, at some early stage, be requested to give interviews, which could be used to document history and draw concrete lessons. Pakistan demanded a ‘joint probe into this irresponsible incident and clarification of several fundamental questions regarding security protocols and technical safeguards against the accidental or unauthorized launch of missiles in a nuclearized environment.’ Indian response to this demand can pave the way for regional stability.
Second is the case of ‘responsible behavior.’ Nuclear powers maintain transparency and don’t surprise each other. Predictability helps prevent crises and escalation. The Indians did not use the DGMOs hotline to notify Pakistan immediately. There is only a bilateral agreement to pre-notify surface-to-surface ballistic missile tests, which India has apparently begun disregarding. In future, both sides could consider pre-notifying SLBMs and cruise missile tests. To do that, India has to climb down from its hubris and talk with Pakistan.
The third lesson is about ‘dispute resolution versus crisis management.’ If fundamental disputes between Pakistan and India are settled on mutually agreed-upon terms, such crises may not erupt.
The fourth is about ‘matching capability.’ A strategic balance is necessary to ensure regional peace and stability. India has supersonic missiles and is testing hypersonic missiles. It is also being helped to gain technological prowess and continue with irrational and unnecessary hegemonic designs. BrahMos, for instance, is the fruit of the Indian DRDO and Russian NPOM consortium of ‘Missile Industry Complex,’ which has reportedly ‘penetrated the international market with the most potent weapon systems for a precision strike and a force multiplier in network-centric warfare.’ India’s ongoing partnership with the United Sates will take the former’s technological and military edge to the next level. Pakistan must develop matching capabilities to stabilize deterrence and normalize Indian behavior.
What can be the Future?
There is quantitative and qualitative flux in the nuclear deterrence capabilities of some nuclear powers. If India claims to be a responsible nuclear-armed state, it should exercise self-deterrence from launching a limited conventional war or testing the Pakistani threshold through apparently errant missiles.
Indian propensity to use disruptive nuclear and non-nuclear weapons that can create strategic effects is destabilizing. If Pakistan does not exercise its characteristic restraint in the next crisis, India can trigger a regional conflict with global implications.
In the 2019 Kashmir crisis, later the BrahMos incident in 2022, and the recent Iranian misadventure, Pakistan has amply shown that it retains the flexibility to respond promptly to provocations. While Pakistan exercised restraint in 2022, in the future, it may go for the quid-pro-quo (QPQ) and call the Indian bluff. Pakistan remains alive to the pulsating threats and, in the wake of Indian irresponsible actions, will take all steps to maintain Full-Spectrum Deterrence.
Dr Atia Ali Kazmi is Director Research at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad.
