It is essential to know how a military doctrine differs from a maritime doctrine. The former embodies hard military power with a defined set of principles for its application. The latter denotes the sum total of sea power, the physical, demographic, geographic, and military resources derived from or related to the sea. The sea power of a nation involves, but is not limited to, mercantile marine (commercial shipping), marine or civil maritime industries, ports, harbors, shipyards, maritime zones (EEZ) with marine resources therein, seabed minerals, navies, coastguards, and where relevant includes a contribution of land and air forces of a country. It further implies power, both at and from the sea.
To sum up, a maritime doctrine is a combination of soft as well as hard power or the aggregate of a nation’s ability, inclusive of policy apparatus, to ensure control and safeguard of its maritime zones and other maritime interests during peace and war.
Put another way, while a military doctrine involves the application of kinetic power alone, a maritime doctrine by contrast encompasses all elements of sea power including economic dimension (soft power) besides maritime military (combat) power (vested in navies, coast guard, coastal police, etc.).
A maritime doctrine entrusted to a navy must ensure fulfilling two primary responsibilities at home and abroad – preservation and protection of the national maritime interests of a state. Unlike the army or air force with combat operations restricted broadly within the geographical limits of a country, a navy largely operates in international waters just outside 12 nautical miles from a country’s coast and could carry a nation’s flag to the farthest reaches of the planet. For the record, there is also a huge body of international maritime law that governs maritime operations which must also be complied with.
Founded on historical experiences and changes occurring in a strategic environment, a doctrine serves as a benchmark in policy making. A defense policy issued by any government dictates and drives all the elements of its military (land, air, and naval) through formulating developmental and employment strategies. In most countries, while the title “maritime doctrine” has been retained, the respective navies have often led and composed such a document. Ergo, navies in each country have devised Australian, British, and Indian maritime doctrines.
A doctrine widely differs from Fleet orders, Compendiums, Temporary Memoranda, etc. In the Pakistan Navy, these are defined in Navy Regulations (NR) of 1988 as: “Orders and instructions of the Chief of the Naval Staff on day to day administrative matters in the Navy–. These are in addition to various books of regulations, PBRs, Navy Instructions and Joint Services Instructions. Government letters may also be reproduced in Fleet Orders,” states NR.
The first edition of the Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan (MDP) was unveiled in 2018 by Mr. Arif Alvi, the President of Pakistan. The ceremony was held at Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), the premier seat of learning in the Pakistan Navy. The ownership of the Maritime Doctrine was and continues to rest with Pakistan Navy War College. It was at this institute that over some six years, several drafts were constructed, extensively studied, and deliberated by a range of accomplished practitioners, scholars as well as reputed international maritime experts before the first edition was formally authorized for release. The issue of ‘jointness’ with other services was widely contemplated as well.
In Pakistan, the tri-service military operations are nevertheless a progressing phenomenon. The first edition of MDP consequently restricts itself to a brief discourse on peacetime and wartime operations by the Pakistan Navy.
Ipso facto, the role of Pakistan Navy during 1971 war is worth recalling here. It was PN Submarine Ghazi (PNS Ghazi) which kept the bulk of Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet confined to fringes of the Bay of Bengal until its own sinking. Another PN Submarine Hangor meanwhile turned the strategic tide in favor of Pakistan in North Arabian Sea after it sank an Indian frigate Khukri. All this meant pushing the Indian Navy to a defensive posture. These are classical cases in history that aided in improving overall freedom of action to the benefit of Pakistan’s military.
Given the Cold War dynamics and a colonial legacy of so-called martial races joining the armed forces, Pakistan has perennially suffered from what is called “maritime blindness” (also sea blindness). It is an affliction in which large segments of the general population and governments remain ignorant of the maritime future and matters related to oceans. It is not specific to any particular country, and in fact, many advanced countries also suffer from this disorder.
There was a widely held belief in the Pakistan Navy that despite its enormous contributions both, during war as well as in peace, the service is not well understood even at the inter-services level let alone in country’s north. The inextricable link between import driven national economy underpinned by sea-based commerce particularly, critically important fossil fuels (oil, LNG, and coal), and the navy was never understood in major parts of the country. As a measure, an average of 2.5 ships disembarked energy-related cargo at Pakistani ports daily in 2020, according to credible statistics. In a crisis, without such fuel reshipments, the strategic reserves could deplete rapidly, and no military tank, fighter aircraft, or other combatant would be able to mobilize.
Major shifts in the strategic environment following the events of September 2001 reinforced the belief that Pakistan Navy must come up with a document which quintessentially serves a dual purpose: educational cum informational as well as an introductory doctrinal source. The “purpose” of the first edition of MDP is accordingly defined at the onset: “…to provide understanding to all stakeholders on the distinctive attributes of national maritime sector and the role of Pakistan navy in national security…” (pp3).
The first edition of MDP was formulated as part of maritime and naval outreach initiative by Pakistan Navy. It provides introductory narrative for in-country and overseas readership. The elementary knowledge on the national maritime sector and variety of naval features is meant for academia, intelligentsia, and bureaucracy among others. It is predominantly an “informative” endeavor to “educate” stakeholders and interested parties.
As such MDP had little to demonstrate classical military doctrinal approach and embarked upon a course to be more “informational” and less “doctrinal.” The first five chapters in the MDP educate a reader with essentials like military instruments of sea power, distinctive characteristics of the maritime environment, a brief history of developments in the Indian Ocean, various dimensions of the maritime environment besides Pakistan’s maritime interests and myriad non-traditional threats and challenges like piracy, trafficking, etc. which infest the maritime commons. This is of course beyond the pale of hard-core military threats that endure.
On the issue of “doctrinal and strategic” ambiguity, readers may note that Pakistan’s overall strategic posture remains ambiguous and indistinct for well-known reasons. Pakistan has not formally published any strategic doctrine either. The available material is only through formal statements of top officials rendered at national and international forums, including local and overseas think tanks of repute. Weapons development is meanwhile an ongoing process in strategic posturing. Also, at the time of publication of first edition, strategic developments like AUKUS, Quad, BECA, LEMOA, COMCASA, and MSRA had not occurred. The geopolitical landscape too was quite different. The end of war and piracy related security threats in Yemen and Somali respectively, emergence of Israel as a player in the Indian Ocean, withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, INS Arihant, the Indian navy SSBN completing first deterrent patrol etc. are subsequent developments. Though apportionment of share in defence budget has undoubtedly been a concern for the Pakistan Navy, it is nowhere central to MDP. Given the innate dynamic attributes of the strategic environment, MDP was envisaged to be reviewed only after five years.
The second edition of MDP currently under process is intended to build on the inaugural edition. It will dilate on the roles of the Pakistan Navy; what it does at and from the sea in a much more eloquent manner and greater depth. It will also provide stakeholders with extensive insight into the military-strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and its influence on Pakistan’s maritime interests. The new edition will expound blue economy and its relationship with maritime security. It will explain Gwadar port under CPEC and the prospective regional connectivity that it offers. The benchmark for the new edition will be National Security Policy of 2022-2026.
The narrative appearing in some recent papers that examined MDP and carried by prominent publications is more or less a regurgitation of worn-out clichés without any breakthrough or noteworthy research critique. There is no gainsaying that if access to a primary source is available and is not availed, in this case (PNWC), it unquestionably raises questions on the quality of research. It furthermore runs counter to the spirit of research ethics.
Note: The views expressed in the article are those of the author and not necessarily that of Pakistan Navy or Pakistan Navy War College. The article aims to clarify some of the views expressed in, “Major power competition in the Indian Ocean and doctrinal development in Pakistan” published in “Comparative Strategy, Volume 42-Issue 4, authored by Dr Khurram Iqbal & Muneeb Salman and, “Advocating by Doctrine: The Pakistan Navy’s Experience,” published by Centre for International Maritime Security, October 16, 2023. The author, a retired naval officer with over 47 years of experience as practitioner and in the field of maritime security and nuclear research studies, can be reached at mazamkhan54@gmail.com.
