India first tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974. It tested them again after 24 years in 1998 to reinforce its nuclear weapons capability. New Delhi developed nuclear weapons capability for prestige and status, not genuine security reasons. Their nuclear weapons ambition dates back to independence from British Raj once Homi Bhabha returned from the UK after the tutelage of Rutherford, who was one of the premier scientists in using nuclear energy for military purposes.
In a 1997 meeting, the then Indian prime minister Gujral told US President Bill Clinton that when he looked at the door into the Security Council chamber, he saw a little sign that read, ‘only those with economic wealth or nuclear weapons allowed.’ He told Clinton that it was very difficult to achieve economic wealth, implying that nuclear weapons capability was the other way to enter the exclusive club.
Although India labeled its first nuclear tests of 1974 as Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE), it was just a ploy to kosher it in public view and avoid criticism. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) once entered into force outlaws all kinds of nuclear explosions irrespective of the labeling. By labeling the 1974 tests as PNE, India also wanted to avoid any sanctions because it had diverted nuclear fuel it was provided for civil purposes only. In order to achieve the status of a nuclear weapons state and enhance its profile as a big power, it wanted to shed any doubts about its prowess by opting for full-fledged nuclear tests in 1998.
India was also going through a rough phase in its domestic politics during the 1990s. Domestic politics had a profound impact on the Indian decision-making to go for hot testing. Going ahead, nuclear tests would have given the government more political capital and support – several political parties, whether in government or opposition, had a strong ideological base for such a decision. The nuclear capability was mentioned in the election manifestos of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) during those years.
On the arms control front like CTBT, the international situation was evolving fast during the 1990s. The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely. It meant that any new state would not be recognized under the treaty in the future if it conducted nuclear tests. There was no option left for a state if it wanted to achieve a similar status like NPT’s N-5 states after the NPT indefinite extension. In the case of India, the NPT was largely irrelevant if it wanted to test nuclear weapons. Regarding the CTBT, the pressure to test nuclear weapons largely came from it as it was up to India to decide whether to test or not since it directly called on India and Pakistan to adhere to non-testing. The treaty would not enter into force without ratification by these countries and the US was strongly lobbying for its entry into force in those years. The sooner India tested its weapons the better it was for it to ward off the pressure. Interestingly, the US continues to pursue others to sign and ratify the CTBT, while it has never ratified it itself despite conducting many nuclear weapons tests. For this reason, many other states have lost enthusiasm for CTBT.
There is a bizarre claim made by an Indian author that Pakistan had acquired a ready-made nuclear device from China. This claim goes beyond imagination as this is not only an unthinkable idea but also negates the fact that Pakistan had pursued different paths to develop a nuclear device successfully during the mid-1980s.
In total contrast to what India says, Pakistan was a strong advocate of the nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia for many years. Pakistan proposed a joint declaration with India renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons in 1978, and the proposal of a bilateral non-testing regime in South Asia in 1987 among others. Since these were aimed at the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, totally against what India wanted, it rejected all these proposals. Indian aim was to acquire nuclear weapons to elevate its status equal to other N-5 countries.
It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan was proposing all these measures despite the fact that India had already tested nuclear devices in 1974. Later, although Pakistan had developed nuclear capability by the mid-1980s it didn’t go for nuclear testing till forced after Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. Pakistan couldn’t afford to sit idle after the Indian nuclear tests and the subsequent strategic environment emerging in South Asia. Indian leadership had started to threaten Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan was actually forced by India to follow suit and restore the strategic balance in the region.
Had India accepted Pakistan’s earlier proposals, we might have a different South Asia today, free of nuclear weapons. However, that has been overtaken by time and nuclear weapons are a reality in the region today and efforts need to be focused on nuclear risk reduction and strategic restraint regime between the two countries. Now, for the past several years, India has been signaling a resumption of testing thermonuclear weapons. Its leading statesmen, academics, and Indian diaspora have been busy testing the waters for possible reactions and creating space in the public eye once India tests again. Pakistan was not the first one to test weapons and did not enter the nuclear weapons club by choice. Now, if India resumes testing, Islamabad may not blink in testing nuclear weapons.
This article was published in another form at https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/indian-nuclear-tests-assumptions-and-facts/
Mr Samran Ali
Mr Samran Ali is currently working as a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad.
