India claims that it has an unblemished non-proliferation record and has been seeking mainstreaming into what is already a discriminatory nuclear order on this premise. However, the reality is different. There has been a consistent pattern of Indian proliferation and irresponsible activities ranging from nuclear theft incidents to diversion of nuclear material supplied for peaceful purposes to military use and illegal procurement of nuclear materials to centrifuge know-how leakage. Likewise, New Delhi’s nuclear safety and security record is chequered. These issues are brushed under the carpet for geopolitical reasons. An accountability process will be needed for ensuring non-proliferation, peace, and stability in this region.
Diversion of civil nuclear assistance for weapons use
The most important and glaring example of India’s proliferation is the 1974 nuclear explosion. India illegally diverted nuclear fuel from the reactor supplied by Canada for peaceful and civilian use, to conduct a nuclear weapon test. That test raised alarm to the extent that the US and several other countries decided to create the erstwhile London Group, which was later renamed as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to regulate global nuclear trade.
Similarly, India had an agreement with the US in 1963, which covered the two nuclear power reactors at Tarapur and their fuel. After 1974 Indian nuclear test, the US suspected that the supply of uranium was being diverted for the weaponization of India’s nuclear program, rather than harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. More so, between 1983 and 1989 India received at least 80 tons of Soviet heavy water covertly, and 26.5 tons of Norwegian heavy water through diversions.
Import of centrifuge technology
In a 2007 report, Mark Fitzpatrick, the then Director at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) London, provided details of India’s proliferation activities. As per the report, India potentially exported dual-use technology from the illicit nuclear black market. A Belfer Center’s research paper of 2014 mentioned that the timelines of India’s development of super-critical or ultra-centrifuge technology matches that of Iran and North Korea and most of the critical breakthroughs occurred at around the same time when these countries were actively engaged in acquiring centrifuge design information, prototypes and materials from the illicit nuclear black market.
India’s centrifuge program was also heavily dependent on illicit nuclear trade throughout the 1980s and 90s. Moreover, in 2012, Joshua Pollack, a US policy wonk who has worked on nuclear proliferation, claimed that India was the active customer of the black-market network. Joshua mentioned that black market network provided the shortcut to a nuclear weapon to India besides Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
Nuclear thefts and accidents
India has had a long history of thefts of nuclear material, mishaps, and accidents at its nuclear facilities. The first recorded incident of nuclear smuggling in India dates to November 1994, when Meghalaya police seized 2.5 kilograms of uranium from a gang of four smugglers in the Domiasiat region. In June 1998, the police arrested an opposition politician in the Indian state of West Bengal, considered to be carrying more than 100 kilograms of uranium. In July 1998, the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) unearthed a major racket in theft of uranium in Tamil Nadu, with the seizure of over 8 kilograms of nuclear material. In August 2001, police in the Indian state of West Bengal arrested two men with more than 200 grams of semi-processed uranium.
In 2003 yet again, Indian agencies caught so-called members of a terror group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen in a village on the Bangladesh border with 225 grams of milled uranium. In December 2006, a container packed with radioactive material was stolen from a government-run research facility in eastern India. In 2008, another group was caught trying to smuggle low-grade uranium from one of India’s state-owned mines. In 2013, guerilla fighters in northeast India illegally obtained uranium ore from a government-run milling complex in northeast India and strapped it to high explosives to make a crude bomb before being caught by the police.
As if this was not enough, in December 2016, around 9 kilograms of radioactive uranium was seized from two persons in Thane. Yet again in early 2018 a uranium smuggling racket was caught by the Kolkata police with one kilogram of radioactive material. Recently in June 2021 Government of India seized 6.4 kilograms of uranium in Jharkhand, and 7 kilograms uranium in Maharashtra in May 2021. Similarly, on 26 August 2021, 250.5 kilograms of californium, a highly radioactive and toxic substance were seized in Kolkata. Frequent incidents of nuclear smuggling indicate the failure of nuclear security system at multiple levels.
Proliferation by individuals and entities
The US has sanctioned several Indian entities for transferring technologies and know-how to Iraq and Iran that could contribute to chemical or biological weapons programs. The US clamped sanctions on five Indian entities and four individuals for their involvement in proliferation. In 2002-03, the US imposed sanctions on the Indian entity Hans Raj Shiv for transferring WMD equipment and technology to Iraq. Protech Consultants Pvt Ltd came under sanctions in 2003 for transfers to Iraq. NEC Engineers Pvt Limited came under US sanctions in 2003 for proliferation activities related to chemical and biological weapons.
In 2004, Indian scientist Dr Prasad and former Chairman of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited Dr Surendar were both sanctioned by the US for facilitating Iran’s WMD and missile related program. In 2007, two Indian nationals Sudarshan and Mythili were arrested in the US for illegally transferring latest computer technology meant for missile guidance system for India’s research and development entities. Likewise, Sabero Organic and Sandhya Organic Chemicals Pvt Ltd were sanctioned in 2005 for proliferation to Iran. Moreover, the mysterious and unnatural deaths of 11 prominent Indian nuclear scientists during a four year period from 2009-2013 in India show that the Indian nuclear program has never been transparent and doubtlessly suspicious.
It is an open secret that India maintained an unholy nuclear connection with North Korea. For several years, India’s nuclear assistance to North Korea remained under the carpet, but UN Panel of Experts (UN PoE) report revealed that number of North Korean nuclear scientists attended courses on space science and satellite technology at the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP) in northern India.
The above-mentioned worrying theft incidents invite serious attention. These recurring incidents raise some important questions about India’s nuclear safety and security practices. Moreover, the recorded incidents of the seizure of uranium questions India’s reputation as a responsible nuclear state. This organized yet repetitive pattern of nuclear material theft incidents have increased the probability of nuclear terrorism originating from the Indian soil. With the stolen material, terrorist groups based in India do not construct functional nuclear device but could manufacture radiation dispersal device (RDD), also called dirty bomb.
Each nuclear state is responsible for ensuring nuclear safety and security. However, against the backdrop of the potential damage, which these weapons can bring, they have become an international concern. Silence of world community on Indian proliferation activities is alarming not only for regional but international security and stability. Ironically, NSG, which was formed as the result of India’s diversion of civil nuclear technology to conduct nuclear weapon test, gave a waiver to India for conducting nuclear export. Moreover, India was made part of many other regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement. As a result of these favors to India by the international community, non-proliferation regime and efforts lost their worth. It is need of the hour that the world should take notice and stop turning a blind eye to India’s horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation as such a type of loose state control shows that the country is not even close to becoming a responsible nuclear power.
About the Author
Sharjeel Afzal is Masters in Strategic and Nuclear Studies and works as Research Associate at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), Islamabad.
