The US has been banking on India for its support in an emerging multipolar world. It sees India as one of the most relevant partners in helping it to achieve its global ambitions, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the Indian approach and the conduct of its foreign policy, especially during the Ukraine War, have demonstrated the limits of Indian commitment to its partnership with the US.
Three important developments suggest that India not only disregarded the US concerns over the Ukraine War but has openly defied it and benefitted Russia. Firstly, India has stayed away from condemning Russia in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Indian abstention from condemning Russia at these forums means it does not agree with the US narrative of Russia being the aggressor or Ukraine being at the receiving end of its aggression. For the US, it has exposed India’s limited ability as a dependable partner in the UN and other international forums.
Secondly, the trends of Indian trade with Russia during the Ukraine War show the divergence of its interests vis-à-vis the US. The US and its western allies have imposed strict sanctions on Russia to block its war efforts in Ukraine, but the increase in the import of Russian oil by India has negated those sanctions. India’s trade policy has directly benefitted Russia and has given it a crucial lifeline. India saw Ukraine War as an opportunity to increase the import of Russian oil at cheaper rates. Its oil import from Russia has jumped fifty times compared to the previous year.
Indian strategic thinking also justifies its current position. For India, neutrality, autonomy, or non-alignment have been important slogans throughout the Cold War.
For India, Russia is its primary arms provider. Today, a large inventory of Indian Air Force aircraft is of Russian origins, such as the Sukhoi Su-30MKi, MiG-29, and MiG-21. The most advanced air defence system, the S-400, is supplied by Russia, the Indian Navy operates frigates and aircraft carriers of Russian origin, and Russia has also leased a nuclear submarine to the Indian Navy. Indian Army operates Russian helicopters and main battle tanks. The Brahmos supersonic cruise missile is also built jointly with Russia. In sum, more than 60-70% of its military equipment is of Russian origin. India cannot antagonise Russia to please the US, as it will adversely affect Indian military strength.
Along with these three parameters, Indian strategic thinking also justifies its current position. For India, neutrality, autonomy, or non-alignment have been important slogans throughout the Cold War. Those Indian policies served as useful slogans aimed at extracting benefits from both superpowers, i.e., the US and the erstwhile USSR. India believes that chalking out a unique stance independent of big powers will give it more credibility as a major power and add to its status and might.
Enjoying robust relations with the West and Russia, India should have taken an approach to bring them closer to finding a solution to their rivalry. On the contrary, its focus has been mainly on securing its own interests. It has not shied away from achieving its interests in this period. Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has bracketed Indian interests as securing fuel, food, and fertiliser supplies against the shortages created by the Ukraine War. However, more importantly, Russia is India’s largest source of military hardware. That is why India has refrained from taking any position that could harm its relations with Russia as it continues purchasing military hardware from Russia.
India has strongly defended its trade with Russia. Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has argued that if Europe can buy Russian gas, then why India cannot buy Russian oil. However, it is a weak logic as stopping the purchase of Russian gas immediately was possible for Europe with little to no alternatives available. As for India, alternative sources of oil were available in the Middle East. Moreover, taking advantage of the opportunity, India increased its oil import, consequently benefitting Russia.
Another aspect of India’s relations with Russia and the US is that it has a long history of a strategic partnership with Russia, which has become an indispensable partner. On the other hand, the Indian strategic partnership with the US is relatively new. India cannot compromise the longevity of its relations with Russia for a more limited experience with the US. Therefore, it may not be wrong to say that its relations with the US will not be at the cost of its relations with Russia.
It can be argued that the containment of China is the central pillar of the US closeness to India. Hence, it may not bother the US how India sees and reacts to the Ukraine War. Although, in a broader context, China is not the only factor that makes India special for the US. Nevertheless, India’s course of action regarding the Ukraine War has demonstrated limits of India’s commitment to its partnership with the US and the limited space for the US to bank on India.
This article was published in the Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR) on July 14, 2022. https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/indias-commitment-to-its-partnership-with-the-us/