Pakistan’s decision towards developing and testing Multiple Independent Re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capable missiles is within Pakistan’s policy of “full spectrum deterrence under the dictum of credible minimum deterrence”. It is a response to counter the new threat perception emerging from New Delhi because of its constant efforts to develop and expand its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. Islamabad fears that India’s operationalization of its BMD systems on land and at sea would significantly undermine Pakistan’s ability to retaliate to India’s first strike. Islamabad is worried that BMD along with the enhanced missile capabilities of India, especially in terms of speed and precision, is part of the Indian strategy to launch counterforce strikes against Pakistan’s deterrent forces. Therefore, the goal of Ababeel’s development is to neutralize the threat that the operational Indian BMD system poses to Pakistan’s deterrent forces and ultimately to South Asia’s strategic stability.
Pakistan’s MIRV capable Ababeel’s development revolves around the Indian efforts to develop and operationalize its BMD. India is presently developing a missile defense shield to protect its command-and-control centers, major population and industrial centers, and critical military infrastructure including missile storage sites, airfields, and large cantonments. Indian BMD program commenced in the 1990s, with the first interceptor tested on November 07, 2006, making the country the fourth one to test the anti-ballistic missile apart from the US, Israel, and Russia.
India has a two-tiered ballistic missile system, consisting of Prithvi Air Defence Vehicle (PAD)/Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV), and Ashwin Advanced Air Defense (AAD) interceptors. The former can intercept the missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes between 50-180 kilometers, while the latter can destroy missiles within the atmospheric altitudes (endo-atmospheric), ranging between 20-40 kilometers. Both interceptors have been tested successfully multiple times. Eventually, phase 1 of the BMD culminated in 2019. The phase-I will be deployed soon and according to Indian media sources quoting Indian defense officials, the system will initially protect the two major cities of India; New Delhi (Capital) and Mumbai (Key Business Center).
The Phase-II trials began on November 02, 2022, when India successfully test-fired the AD-1 interceptor, capable of intercepting long-range ballistic missiles in low exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric conditions. It is the “endo-atmospheric and low exo-atmospheric component of India’s Phase-II BMD”. The new interceptor will increase the range of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of up to 5,000 km, a significant enhancement from the Phase 1 range of 2000 km, as revealed by Janes, quoting Indian DRDO officials. To support the tracking and targeting of incoming projectiles, India is constructing a BMD radar site, at Udaipur, likely to become operational by 2024, along with other sites in Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. The sites are being developed to host long-range tracking radar (LRTR); the Swordfish radar, an advanced variant of Israel Green Pine radar.
Additionally, India went one step further and added another leg, this time, the sea leg of its BMD system. It can be seen from the Indian efforts of expanding its capability to launch interceptors from land-based launchers to now attaining the capability to launch the interceptors from sea-based platforms, i.e. naval warships. India for the first time, demonstrated this capability earlier this year in April, by firing a sea-based endo-atmospheric interceptor. It was launched by INS Anvesh, commissioned last year to test Phase-II BMD trials, in this case, the sea-based trials. This platform is a stop-gap arrangement for testing and validating the sea-based BMD interceptors before India deploys the system on the Indian warships.
Now, there is a critical question to discuss here; why current Ababeel test is different from the earlier test, conducted in 2017? The new test is a compulsion caused by India’s expansion of its BMD program. Ababeel is in response to growing Indian BMD capability, and as its phase II has already commenced, and therefore it become necessary for Pakistan to counter this particular development. On paper, the BMD looks like a defensive weapon, but it’s an offensive one and cardinal part of the Indian nuclear strategy of launching pre-emptive strikes on Pakistan’s counter-force targets while remaining immune from Pakistan’s retaliatory nuclear response. Ababeel is an entirely weapon of deterrence, being developed to reduce the Indian counterforce temptations that are being intensified, as the BMD program is developing. These can be seen from Indian efforts to diversify its delivery systems, and persistent efforts to reduce the circular error probability (CEP) to enhance precision, thus, reiterating the presence of a counter-force strategy. The development of AGNI-P, with a reported CEP of only 10 meters, is one such classic example of Indian intentions.
Once the land and sea-based interceptors become functional as they will disturb the mutual vulnerability between both states by reducing the efficacy of a first strike. Last year’s firing of the AD-1 interceptor, and this year’s sea-based launch as part of phase-II trials of BMD, was an attempt by India to clear pathways for the first strike, thus destabilizing the first strike stability. The demonstration of AD-1’s efficacy from both ground and maritime platforms will significantly enhance Indian capability to intercept missiles.
Thus, Pakistan’s efforts to develop Ababeel are compelled in order to maintain its threat credible and to indicate to India that Pakistan will protect its sovereignty and territoriality at all costs and will not submit to Indian coercion. The recent test demonstrates Pakistan’s determination to prevent India from destabilizing the area by developing and deploying an efficient BMD system.
This article was published in another form at https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/why-did-pakistan-test-its-mirv-capable-ababeel-missile/
About The Authors
Mr Abdul Moiz Khan is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad.
Mr Usman Haider is Research Assistant at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) Islamabad.
