US efforts to gain a competitive edge over China is the principal factor in Asia Pacific security. The strategy to contain China encompasses many interests, including economic, military, and strategic influence. The US seeks to expand its military influence in the region and secure access to key resources such as oil and gas. China’s influence in the Asia Pacific is economic in nature, as evident in the Belt and Road Initiative, which has no military component. While the US is seeking to maintain its position as the dominant military and economic power in the region, China is resisting American containment through economic means, but it may be forced to address the military imbalance with the US.
Biden administration’s foreign policy is centered on reinvigorating confidence in the US as a guarantor of global peace and security, a position it carved after emerging as the victor in World War II that soon ended after the US nuclear-bombed two Japanese cities to stone-age. To maintain its hegemony in the Asia Pacific, Washington declared the Indo-Pacific strategy in 2021, which is a military response to its economic competition with China.
While US officials have vowed to engage in regional diplomacy and expand the state’s involvement in multilateralism, the complex nature of these policies risks subverting regional integration. The regional multilateral forums are central to US foreign policy, influenced by its long-term strategic goals. These regional frameworks were once considered venues for cooperation, especially in the Asia Pacific, but they are now more focused on developing military axes. These axes could alter the geostrategic and geopolitical landscape of the region because geography is no longer the basis of their formation – security interests are their core focus.
New US-led Axes of Regional Frameworks
The Sino-US competition has led to new US-led regional frameworks in Asia Pacific, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Australia, UK, and US deal AUKUS. These multilaterals are different from traditional regional frameworks such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asia Summit (EAS), etc.
Quad is an informal strategic alliance between US, Japan, India, and Australia, formed in 2007 in response to China’s growing footprints in Asia Pacific. It primarily focuses on security and strategic issues rather than economic cooperation like traditional regional frameworks. The broader goal of this alliance is to counter China’s rise and its strategic presence in the Asia Pacific region, mainly its economic projects. In the narrow domain, it aims to maintain regional dominance and has the potential of flaming competition in the greater region, such as South Asia which has witnessed an enduring rivalry between its key players, India and Pakistan.
AUKUS, on the other hand, is a new security partnership between the US, UK, and Australia, announced in September 2021. It focuses on developing and deploying nuclear-powered submarines for the Australian Navy. This security partnership is unique as it involves the sharing of sophisticated nuclear technology, which is a departure from traditional security partnerships. Both Quad and AUKUS aim to promote security and strategic cooperation among like-minded countries in the Asia Pacific. Unlike traditional regional frameworks like ASEAN or SAARC, they are not focused on economic cooperation, and their approach is not all-inclusive.
Regional Implications
The current US administration’s strategy of competing with China through tactical multilateralism requires extensive revision. This collaboration with sets of partners to address specific issues and promote initiatives while excluding China carries risks.
By proliferating US-led or US-engaged military axes, Washington may reduce incentives for regional actors to invest in established regional institutions. This is mainly because Quad and AUKUS prioritize strategic cooperation and may be seen as more effective in addressing regional security challenges. Whereas established institutions like ASEAN and SCO may be seen as more focused on dialogue and cooperation among its member states. Regional states may be more inclined to invest in Quad and AUKUS to promote their own security driven interests rather than in established regional institutions. This could ultimately weaken the efficacy of existing regimes, notwithstanding the Biden administration’s rhetorical support for multilateralism in the region.
Secondly, these alliances could hamper regional cohesion by threatening regional countries’ national interests and security because they focus on promoting the interests of a certain group of states rather than promoting regional cooperation and dialogue among all countries in the Asia Pacific region. Moreover, these frameworks are less inclusive and focus on a narrow set of security issues rather than addressing the region’s broader security challenges. Several justifications for their development look vague and superficial as well.
Additionally, the establishment of Quad and AUKUS may lead to a perception that some countries are being forced to choose between different security arrangements. Owing to this, these alliances may impact economic integration and intensify bloc-based divisions in the sub-regions of Asia Pacific. While established institutions like SAARC and ASEAN focused more on promoting harmony and economic prosperity among its member states, Quad and AUKUS pushed the region towards fragmentation.
Impact on South Asia
The Asia Pacific sub-regions are likely to face spillover effects, and South Asia will bear a substantial impact due to the existing tensions among regional rivals. This rivalry can be intensified due to several reasons. First, India is a Quad member and uses it to promote its strategic interests. Sharing of advanced technologies by the West with one party to a conflict may intensify the security dilemma of the other state. It would compel Pakistan to acquire sophisticated technology to maintain parity with India.
In the case of AUKUS, although India is not its member, it still can benefit from this partnership, as AUKUS has set a precedent for nuclear proliferation. India may use it to acquire French nuclear propulsion technology, and if it materializes, it will achieve an assured sea-based second-strike capability (ASSC), undermining Pakistan’s position. An example can be taken from the past when the US went against the rules and gave a nuclear waiver to India in 2008.
A proposal regarding an AUKUS-like arrangement between India, France, and the US (INFRUS), is already down the road, which signals that something is cooking under the table. India’s acquisition of ASSC would gravely undermine nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in South Asia and minimize the possibility of peaceful co-existence in this region. The strategic stability in this region is already fragile due to the military asymmetry between India and Pakistan – two nuclear-armed rivals. Hence, considering the enduring rivalry between two nuclear-armed states in South Asia, the US may reconsider its policy of creating security-related multilaterals and blocs in the Asia Pacific region.
While Pakistan is committed to not playing bloc politics and maintaining cordial relations with all great powers, India, on the other hand, has aligned itself with the emerging blocs, despite its policy of non-alignment. During the Cold War era, India’s so-called non-alignment policy overshadowed its relationship with the US – relations with the USSR were cordial, though, enabling India to reap the maximum benefits of this bilateral setting. By the end of the Cold War, India was relatively ready, in economic and military terms, to change its focus for better leverage, and both states made a conscious effort to remove the barriers that had previously existed between them.
Conclusion
Washington seeks to establish coalitions with like-minded countries and strengthen existing alliances to counter Beijing’s regional initiatives. While this approach may help them achieve their short-term strategic and economic interests, it risks undermining the hard-won regionalism that aided collective action for decades. The increasing economic integration and territorial tensions have been undermining regionalism in this region for a long time, but now, these two trends have taken distinct paths with rare convergences.
The US strategy may reduce the region’s capacity for collective action and cooperation, by creating alternatives to more extensive and diverse regional organizations, leaving it more vulnerable to conflicts and even war. A zero-sum game in Asia between the US and China will not benefit any party. Therefore, the US may have to rethink its policies to align with new regional geopolitical shifts. The recent visit of Secretary Blinken to Beijing might and must set some new trends for reaping collective gains.
This article was published in another form at https://inkstickmedia.com/the-us-is-shaping-the-asia-pacific-for-better-or-worse/
About The Authors
Ms Maryyum Masood is Research Officer/Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
Ms Amna Saqib is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
